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INTRODUCTION

In the world of music-copyright litigation, "feel" has lately become
a controversial word. Musical feel, some have argued, is becoming too
propertized. When a jury in 2015 found the writers of the hit song
"Blurred Lines" liable for infringing Marvin Gaye's "Got to Give It Up,"I

observers protested that the two songs' true point of similarity was
nothing more than their shared feel-something that should be freely
available to anyone. 2 Pharrell Williams, one of the defendants, similarly

*Permission is hereby granted for noncommercial reproduction of this Article in whole or in part
for education or research purposes, including the making of multiple copies for classroom use,
subject only to the condition that the name of the author, a complete citation, and this copyright
notice and grant of permission be included in all copies.
" Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. For helpful comments and conversations, I thank Chris
Buccafusco and Kristelia Garcia. Any errors in either concept or tone are my fault.
1See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
2 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 212 Songwriters, Composers, Musicians, and Producers in
Support of Appellants at 3, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 15-56880)
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae] ("[T]he verdict in this case, if based upon the music at all, was
based upon the jury's perception that the overall 'feel' or 'groove' of the two works is similar, as
songs of a particular genre often are."); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Restructuring
CopyrightInfringement, 98 TEX. L. REV. 679, 681 (2020), https://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/03/Parchomovsky.Printer.pdf [https://penna.cc/G3K8-3F9E] (arguing that, "while
'Blurred Lines' shared some of the 'feel' of Gaye's 'Got to Give It Up,' .... [the] jury decided that
the appropriation of the mood and feel of Gaye's song was enough to ground a decision of
infringement"); Peter Lee & Madhavi Sunder, The Law ofLook and Feel, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 529,
541 (2017), https://southerncalifornialawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/90_529.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/B3JH-6MB7] (characterizing the copyright infringement suit as a dispute "involving the
'feel' of a 1970s song"); Amy X. Wang, Why All Your Favorite Songs Are Suddenly Being Sued,
ROLLING STONE (Aug. 2, 2019, 12:46 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/pro/features/katy-perryled-zeppelin-ed-sheeran-music-lawsuits-865952/ [https://perma.cc/232J-UD2U] ("Throughout most
of the last century, copyright lawyers and music creators held a default view that copyright claims
were valid for lyrics and melody, but not for more abstract details such as rhythm, beats and feel.
The 'Blurred Lines' case forever changed the status quo when [the] court . . . [held the appellants
liable] for creating too similar of a 'vibe' to Gaye's 1977 hit tGot to Give It Up."'); 7 Reasons the
'BlurredLines' Verdict Should Have Everyone Spooked, BET (Mar. 13,2015), https://www.bet.com
/music/photos/20 1 5/03/7-reasons-the-blurred-lines-verdict-should-have-everyone-spooked.html#!
031315-music-pharrell-robin-thicke [https://penna.cc/UNC8-LB2K] (criticizing the verdict for
creating an environment where "[t]he [f]eel of a [s]ong [c]an [n]ow [b]e [c]opyrighted").
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tried to explain his disagreement with the outcome by insisting that "you
can't copyright a feeling." 3

In the few years since, the same criticism has been leveled against
subsequent, equally newsworthy infringement trials involving Led

Zeppelin and Katy Perry. 4 Those claims eventually lost, unlike the one in
the Blurred Lines case, but they still proved remarkably hard to shake.
After failing to secure a dismissal on summary judgment,5 Led Zeppelin

won at trial, only to see that verdict overturned on appeal; it took a rare
en banc rehearing for the noninfringement verdict to be reinstated-six
years after the case began. 6 The Katy Perry claim, meanwhile, would
have ended in liability had the trial judge not vacated the jury's
infringement verdict, a decision that at the time of this writing remains
on appeal.7

Where a song's compositional details end and its overarching gestalt
begins is, of course, endlessly contestable. Pretty much everyone agrees
that a song's feel-whatever that is-shouldn't be proprietary. Indeed, in
the BlurredLines case itself, the Gaye estate expressly backed away from
the notion that its claim was seeking protection for any such thing.8 The
trouble is trying to define what this unprotectable thing called feel is in
any given case.

3 Ryan

Reed, Pharrell Reflects on Blurred Lines' Lawsuit Verdict: 'You Can't Copyright a
Feeling', ROLLING STONE (Nov. 4, 2019, 9:41 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/musicnews/pharrell-rick-rubin-blurred-lines-lawsuit-verdict-908084/ [https://penna.cc/X695-R354].
4 See Karl Fowlkes, The Katy Perry Copyright Case Is Worrisome., MEDIUM: THE COURTROOM
(Aug. 8, 2019), https://medium.com/the-courtroom/the-katy-perry-copyright-case-is-worrisomec1385ac3e424 [https://penna.cc/7TXH-KV4C] (observing that, after a jury's finding of
infringement in the Katy Perry copyright case, "[p]eople in the music business are worried that this
ruling will lead to more rulings that unfairly penalize songwriters for making use of simplified
musical elements, like a basic note or a song's 'feel"'); Bobby Owsinski, Songwriters Could
Actually Catch Break As DOJ Weighs In On "Stairway To Heaven" Case, HYPEBOT (Sept. 2,
2019), https://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2019/09/songwriters-could-actually-catch-break-as-doj
-weighs-in-on-stairway-to-heaven-case.html [https://penna.cc/HG3L-FHMC] (contending that,
"[f]or the past few years," high-profile copyright infringement lawsuits have placed "songwriters
. . under siege in the courtroom," where "[i]t seems like the feel of the song has more to do with
the actual verdict than the melody").
5 See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, No. CV 15-3462 RGK (AGRx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51006
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2016).
6 See Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
7 See Gray v. Perry, No. 2:15-CV-05642-CAS-JCx, 2020 U.S. Dist LEXIS 46313 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
16, 2020); see also Bill Donahue, Katy Perry CopyrightAccuser Takes Case To 9th Circ., LAW360
(Apr. 16, 2020, 3:20 PM), https://0-www-law360-com.ben.bc.yu.edu/articles/1264505/katy-perrycopyright-accuser-takes-case-to-9th-cir-.
8 See Reporter's Transcript of Trial Proceedings Day 7 -P.M. Session at 82, Williams v. Bridgeport
Music, Inc., No. CV 13-06004-JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2015), ECF No. 339 ("This is not
about era or feeling. This is about a specific song Got to Give it Up and the copying of it."); see
also Richard Busch, Marvin Gaye Family Lawyer: How I Won the 'Blurred Lines' Trial,
HOLLYWOOD REP. (Mar. 11, 2015, 4:02 PM), https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/marvin
-gaye-family-lawyer-how-780743 [https://penna.cc/M48V-9YVM] (recounting the winning
attorney's view that the accused infringers "wanted to litigate this in the press by continually saying
that all they did was take a feeling," but that the case was in fact "a straight-up copyright claim over
compositional elements").
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Judges have an inevitably hard job trying to sift between a musical
work's protectable and unprotectable content. It's fair to wonder, though,
whether existing infringement doctrine makes that job harder than it
needs to be. However unprotectable a song's feeling is, many courts still
insist on measuring its "total concept and feel" under the standard
originally articulated by Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., the
quinquagenarian case at the center of this symposium. 9 That

measurement is usually walled off from expert opinion and depends
instead on the fact finder's lay reaction. 10 As others have noted, requiring
such lay evaluation of music's total concept and feel-call it tonal
concept and feel, perhaps-seems to invite mischief . What, after all,
could a fact finder applying that standard possibly be measuring if not a
song's feeling?
Unsurprisingly, then, this test has become a common target for
critics of today's music-infringement litigation trends.i 2 Every so often,
a litigant tries unsuccessfully to convince a court that the test should be
jettisoned from music cases in particular. 13 Over two hundred composers
9 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
10 See infra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Christopher Jon Sprigman & Samantha Fink Hedrick, The Filtration Problem in
Copyright 's "SubstantialSimilarity"Infringement Test, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 571, 580, 596
(2019), https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/28480-lcb232article3sprigmanpdf [https://penna.cc/7Y47P5MU] (criticizing the standard for "invit[ing] the jury, in exercising its subjective judgment, to
include similarities in ideas and other elements of works that the idea/expression distinction places
outside the scope of copyright" and opening the door to liability "based on mere similarity in
musical style or 'vibe' both of which are unprotectable elements of musical composition").
12 While this Article's focus is the test's application in music cases, the test has also drawn criticism
that is not specific to any particular category of subject matter. See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
COMPENDIUM OF U.S.

COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES

§

310.4

(3d ed.

2017),

https://

www.copyright.gov/comp3/docs/compendium.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F55V-6NTJ] (refusing to
consider a work's "look and feel" when assessing its originality for registration purposes and
concluding that "[i]nvoking a work's 'feel' is not a viable substitute for an objective analysis of the
work's fixed and creative elements"); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 13.03[A][1][c] (2020) (characterizing "feel" as "a wholly amorphous referent [that]
merely invites an abdication of analysis"); ROBERT A. GORMAN ET AL., COPYRIGHT: CASES AND
MATERIALS (9th ed. 2017) (posing the question of whether "the 'concept and feel' standard [is]
facially inconsistent with the exclusion of 'concepts' from the subject matter of copyright under
§ 102(b)"); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 683, 719 (2012), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/voll25_tushnet.pdf
[https://penna.cc/K49M-DRFW] ("Roth is misguided.... Roth illustrates that the gestalt approach
expands protection unpredictably . . . . Results in infringement are deliberately opaque: the
factfinder is directed to the gestalt, but a gestalt can't be broken down."); Pamela Samuelson, A
Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1832-34
(2013),
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1045&
context=nulr [https://penna.cc/UJ9Q-M3LK] (cataloging multiple "troubling things" about the test,
including that "it does not focus the trier of fact's attention on specific expressive elements of the
plaintiff's work or on whether the defendant copied those expressive elements from the plaintiff's
work" and that it "makes it too easy for unprotectable elements to be swept into the infringement
analysis").
13 As I discuss below, however, it's usually the plaintiffs in these cases not the defendants who
try to eliminate the test, convinced that they have a better shot at proving their case by delving into
the musical weeds. See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421, 424 n.2 (9th Cir. 1987) (declining to
address the plaintiff's argument that a holistic test geared toward lay audiences doesn't work "in
technical fields such as music because an infringer can easily deceive the unsophisticated by
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argued in an amicus brief in the Blurred Lines case that the test is
"hamper[ing]" music law and "does not work in a music context" because
essentially every song within a given genre "has the same 'total concept
and feel.'"14 Several copyright scholars who would have preferred to see
the defense win that case have similarly cast blame on the total concept
and feel test for the outcome. 15
In this brief symposium contribution, however, I want to explain

why I disagree. Whatever problems the total concept and feel test creates
in infringement doctrine generally, in music cases specifically it's
nowhere near as bad as it's often portrayed. It's not that I think that
liability was the normatively proper result in edge cases like Blurred
Lines or its successors-as I've written about elsewhere, I don't. 16 I think,
rather, that this part of the infringement test simply isn't doing all that
much in these cases to begin with. Sure, I probably wouldn't
affirmatively choose to include it in the infringement calculus if I were
designing the music-copyright system from scratch. Yet the fact that it's
ended up there turns out to be surprisingly inconsequential.
Instead, if you want to tinker with a doctrinal apparatus that's likely
to have a significant effect on case outcomes, look in the opposite
direction. Not to lay observer-oriented concept and feel, but instead to
experts' finely grained technical analyses. Expert dissection is driving
these music cases-particularly at the summary-judgment stage-more

than the vagaries of feel are. Below I explain how.
I.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF MUSICAL FEEL IN COPYRIGHT LAW

Roth, which involved the visual design of greeting cards, was a case
about images. 17 It's sometime been said that visual works are where the

immaterial variations in the copyrighted work," but noting in dicta that there was "[n]o compelling
reason" to abandon it); Francescatti v. Germanotta, No. 11 CV 5270, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81794,
at *37-38 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 2014) ("Some experts go so far as to argue that the ordinary observer
'total concept and feel' standard should be altogether abandoned .... [but] attempts to entirely do
away with the ordinary observer test with regard to musical works have been rejected."); Guity v.
Santos, No. 18-cv-10387 (PKC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210125, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2019)
(rejecting the plaintiff's argument that "an ordinary observer with no musical background may very
well be incapable of applying the 'total concept and feel test' to determine substantial similarity"
as a "flatly incorrect characterization of the relevant standard").
14 Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 2, at 12 n.4.
15 See, e.g., Lee & Sunder, supra note 2, at 567 ("In the realm of 'sound and feel,' the victory of
Marvin Gaye's estate in its copyright infringement suit against Robin Thicke and Pharrell Williams
suggests that expansive protection of moods, feelings, and zeitgeist may chill future musical
creation."); Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 2, at 685 (classifying the verdict as a paradigmatic
case of "inadvertent infringement . . . involving nothing more than [the] appropriation of 'concept
and feel"'); Sprigman & Hedrick, supra note 11, at 595.
16 Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter of Law, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861 (2018), https://
harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/1861-1923_Online.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
8ACM-WK6G].
17 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
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test is likely to perform best.18 One maj or copyright treatise, for example,
has argued that it fits well in cases dealing with visual subject matter
because such "works can rarely be divided into chapters or paragraphs
like textual works can and instead rely on perceptions of the whole to
convey meaning."

19

Yet while Roth's particular formulation of a holistic similarity
inquiry began with the visual arts, some judges in music cases were
already applying its equivalent decades beforehand. In the 1939 edition
of his first-of-its-kind music-copyright treatise, Alfred Shafter described
a "'bold and intelligent' procedure of determining infringement suits" in
which judges would determine upfront on a dispositive motion whether
similarity was actionable. 20 "Usually expert testimony is obviated by this
method," he continued, "since the judge is guided largely by ordinary
observation-by the 'feel,' or intuitive reaction and effect upon
comparing the two works." 2 1 A test that inquires into a work's "feel"
using "ordinary observation" and "intuitive reaction and effect" sounds,
of course, remarkably like Roth. To be sure, Roth's version would
typically reserve the issue for the jury rather than allow the court to
resolve the case itself 22 But the mode of inquiry is otherwise identical.
The idea of resolving music copyright cases through lay comparison
began even earlier. Its earliest champion was Judge Learned Hand, who
in 1910's Hein v. Harris defined infringement of a musical work as

"similarity [that] is substantially a copy, so that to the ear of the average
person the two melodies sound to be the same." 23 Hand did not rely on
expert testimony. He preferred instead to, as he put it in a later case, "rely
upon such musical sense as I have." 24

See, e.g., Moon Hee Lee, Note, Seeing's Insight: Toward a Visual Substantial Similarity Testfor
Copyright Infringement ofPictorial, Graphic, and Sculptural Works, 111 Nw. U. L. REV. 833, 847
(2017),
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1276&
context=nulr [https://penna.cc/HGJ5-ZD43] (arguing that, notwithstanding its flaws, "since the
protectible aspects of visual works are 'their overall appearance,' the total concept and feel test is
apt for the comparison of [pictorial, graphic, and sculptural] works"); GORMAN ET AL., supra note
12, at 690 ("The 'concept and feel' standard seems to find its way more into cases of pictorial
copyright than literary copyright, probably because the pictorial work can be viewed in a single
glance as a totality."). But see Tushnet, supra note 12, at 719 (noting the ease with which the test
allows courts to slip into protecting uncopyrightable material in visual-works cases).
18

19 3 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT

§ 9:71

(2020).

20 ALFRED M. SHAFTER, MUSICAL COPYRIGHT 217 (2d ed. 1939) (quoting Lowenfels v. Nathan,
2 F. Supp. 73, 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1932)).
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) (concluding that "a subjective
assessment of the 'concept and feel' of two works . . [is] a task no more suitable for a judge than
for a jury").
23 Heinv. Harris, 175 F. 875, 877 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910), aff'd, 183 F. 107 (2d Cir. 1910).
24 Haas v. Leo Feist, Inc., 234 F. 105, 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1916); cf Paul W. Orth, The Use ofExpert
Witnesses in Musical Infringement Cases, 16 U. PITT. L. REV. 232, 236 n.23 (1955) (noting that
Hand tried to identify how a piece would sound to an "average ear" without the help of experts).
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But while Hand's method anticipated the modern total concept and
feel test's aversion to expert opinion, it came nowhere near its holistic
scope. Hand was more interested in counting notes. His usual approach

was to carve out melodic sequences from the rest of the piece by changing
the time values of the defendant's notes to match the plaintiff's,
eliminating differences in pitch duration; transpose the defendant's work
into the same key as the plaintiff's; and then line up the two altered staves
side by side and measure the confluence of pitches. 2 In Hein, Hand's
calculation was that a correspondence between thirteen out of seventeen
totals bars of melody equals infringement. 26 And in 1916's Haas v. Leo
Feist, Inc. ,27 Hand marked up an exhibit himself to show where he found

note-for-note overlaps. 28 Thus, while Hand paved the way for judges to
handle the similarity analysis without expert aid, he was hardly the holist
that Roth would later envision.

Beyond Hand, however, other judges were content to rely on their
aesthetic intuitions without getting into the melodic weeds. These cases,
some of which Shafter cited in his treatise, share a closer family
resemblance with Roth. In Boosey v. Empire Music Co., for example, the

court was tasked with comparing a plaintive English love ballad and a
Tin Pan Alley ragtime number.29 Before preliminarily enjoining the

defendant, the judge recounted that he'd "had some one, indifferent to the
controversy, play both songs for [him]," and found that "the sentiment of
one song [was] about the same as the other." 30 Referring to himself as
"the uninformed and technically untutored public," the judge disclaimed
any interest in "the details" of one song or "the syncopated interpretation"
of the other. 31 What mattered was a shared six-note phrase (what we
might today call a hook) that, in the judge's view, had "the kind of
sentiment in both cases that causes the audiences to listen, applaud, and
buy copies in the corridor on the way out of the theater." 3 2
Similarly, in Parkv. Warner Bros., the court concluded that "[w]hen
the court has an opportunity of comparing the two works in question in a

cause of copyright, it has before it all the data which are necessary to
decide the question of infringement." 33 With that data in hand, the court

25
26
27
28

See Fishman, supra note 16, at 1880.
Hein, 175 F. at 876.
Haas, 234 F. 105.
See Fishman, supra note 16, at 1881.
29 Boosey v. Empire Music Co., 224 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
30 Id. at 647.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Park v. Warner Bros., 8 F. Supp. 37, 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (citing Nichols v. Universal Pictures
Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 1930)).
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cursorily found that "[t]he treatment of the idea involved in the two songs
is different," and therefore no infringement had occurred. 34
That's not to say that every court during this period was uninterested
in the dissection of musicological minutiae, though even then it's not
clear how often it actually moved the needle toward a particular outcome.
In Allen v. Walt Disney Productions, Ltd., for instance, the court spent

considerable time walking through the details of both sides' experts,
whose testimony it readily admitted.3 5 Yet in the end, the court threw up
its hands and confessed, "I cannot differentiate between the two sets of
experts; neither can I say that complainant's experts are correct and the
respondents' incorrect." 3 6 Even with all the expert materials in the record,
the court ultimately fell back on its own instincts.3 7 Using his "own
musical sense, such as it is," the judge reasoned that "to my ear there is a
similarity, but not such a similarity as would impress one. In other words,
I would not take the one for the other." 38
To some extent, it shouldn't be surprising that judges during this era
were inclined to resolve cases themselves. Given that claims for
injunctive relief were heard by courts sitting in equity, bench trials were
the norm.39 Nevertheless, even without a jury as a potential
decisionmaker, it's still notable that courts were willing to decide these
cases through motion practice, and, when they did decide them, consulted
nothing more than the works themselves. By the 1940s, when equity
practice had been replaced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Hand's reliance on the lay-audience was firmly rooted in the case law. 40
As Judge Leon Yankwich wrote in 1942, "it is not the dissection to which

a musical composition might be submitted under the microscopic eye of
a musician which is the criterion of similarity, but the impression which
the pirated song or phrase would carry to the average ear." 4 1 A few years
34 Id. Two years earlier, the same judge had remarked in a dramatic-works case that "inview of the
time which is saved by avoiding a trial," simply comparing the parties' works on paper "should
become the usual method of dealing with copyright suits, unless, owing to nice questions of
originality or access, oral evidence is indicated as necessary." Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73,
75 (S.D.N.Y. 1932).
35 Allen v. Walt Disney Prods., Ltd., 41 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
36 Id. at 140.
37
38

Id.

Id.
39 See Bruce E. Boyden, Daly v. Palmer, or the Melodramatic Origins of the Ordinary Observer,
68 SYRACUSE L. REV. 147, 174 (2018), https://lawreview.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/OBoyden-Article-FINAL.pdf [https://penna.cc/FS23-Z4CU].
40 In one case, the court admitted expert testimony but seemed to have wished that it hadn't, calling
all of it superfluous. See Baron v. Leo Feist, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 686, 686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), aff'd,
173 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1949) ("[T]he musical experts for each side demonstrated, in their zealous
partisanship, the doubtful function of the expert as an aid to the court in this class of litigation.
Nevertheless, the inherent probabilities of the circumstances and the differing qualities of the
testimony made the resolution of most of the issues of fact comparatively easy. The music itself
lent itself quite readily to lay analysis and evaluation.").
41 Carew v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 199, 200-01 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
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later, Arnstein v. Porterwould famously hold that "[t]he impression made

on the refined ears of musical experts or their views as to the musical
excellence of plaintiff's or defendant's works are utterly immaterial on
the issue of misappropriation ....

"42

In a move that has come to define the contemporary copyrightinfringement test, Arnstein categorized lay assessment as a factual issue
for the jury, not a legal one for the court. 43 Because essentially every court
in the country has since followed Arnstein's lead on that question, judges
today cannot easily resolve music-infringement questions themselves the
way their early-twentieth-century predecessors did. 44 Yet even before
Arnstein, let alone before Roth would arrive over two decades later, the
relevant decisionmaker (whether judge or jury) was already measuring
similarity through its own naive reaction to the music.
After the Ninth Circuit decided Roth in 1970, it soon incorporated

the total concept and feel formulation into the "intrinsic" half of its
intrinsic/extrinsic infringement framework. 45 Within that framework,

adjudicating substantial similarity encompasses two steps: an intrinsic
one meant to subjectively measure the fact finder's impressions of
similarity, and an extrinsic one meant to objectively measure similarity
between the works' specific, expressive components. 46
Packaged into this two-part test, the total concept and feel
formulation at first appeared in cases involving visual media. It would
take nearly two decades for it to make its way into a published case
involving musical works. That case was Baxter v. MCA, Inc., in which

the plaintiff claimed that the Academy Award-winning musical theme
for the film E. T. infringed his earlier composition. 47 He had submitted
42 Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946).
43 See id. (dubbing the element of improper appropriation to be "an issue of fact which a jury is
peculiarly fitted to determine"). For a discussion on this decision's influence on the infringement
doctrine, see Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Questionable Origins of the Copyright Infringement
Analysis, 68 STAN. L. REV. 791, 796 (2016), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi
?article=2592&context=faculty scholarship [https://perma.cc/CX3J-B2ED] (explaining that the
court's "decision in Arnstein is . . . to be credited with (or faulted for) giving juries significant
control over the infringement analysis" and how it "in effect cabined trial courts' (i.e., judges')
supervision over the question of copyright infringement").
44 See Balganesh, supra note 43, at 796 n.25 ("To the extent that a judge may grant summary
judgment in some jurisdictions, it is only on the basis that no reasonable juror could have possibly
arrived at a contrary decision.").
45 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977).
46 See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356-57 (9th Cir. 1990). As the Ninth Circuit
subsequently enumerated the two steps in a music infringement case: "Initially, the extrinsic test
requires that the plaintiff identify concrete elements based on objective criteria. The extrinsic test
often requires analytical dissection of a work and expert testimony. Once the extrinsic test is
satisfied, the factfinder applies the intrinsic test. The intrinsic test is subjective and asks 'whether
the ordinary, reasonable person would find the total concept and feel of the works to be substantially
similar."' Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Pasillas
v. McDonald's Corp., 927 F.2d 440, 442 (9th Cir. 1991)).
47 Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987).
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expert testimony opining that there was a high degree of similarity
between the pieces. 48 The district court, however, all but ignored it and
dismissed the case on summary judgment. 4 9 The court declared that it was
the layman's ear that mattered-and that "[t]his Court's 'ear' is as lay as
they come." 5 0
The Ninth Circuit reversed, though without much explanation
51
why. It began by applying Roth's total concept and feel standard to
music, relying on its earlier visual-media precedents. 52 It agreed with the
trial judge that analytic dissection and expert testimony were beside the
point. 53 But it disagreed that anyone but the finder of fact was in a position
to measure the relevant similarity, with or without experts. 54 "We do not
suggest that our ears are any more sophisticated than those of the district
court," it explained. 55 Still, "reasonable minds could differ"-a phrase it
included twice in the span of three sentences without ever stating what
the basis of that difference would be. 56
II. TONAL CONCEPT AND FEEL TODAY

Since Baxter, the total concept and feel standard has become
entrenched as a standard element of music-copyright infringement cases.
Not only is it part of the black-letter test within jurisdictions that follow
the Ninth Circuit's extrinsic/intrinsic framework, 57 but it's also
frequently invoked in jurisdictions that don't.58 In some of these cases, as
in Baxter, the court's inability to definitively rule out dissimilarity in total

concept and feel kept the plaintiff's claim alive. 59 Often the reasoning
rests on little more than the court's discomfort trying to predict what a
hypothetical jury might do, offering no justification for why the particular
claim requires a jury to begin with. 60 Reading those cases, one might
48 Id. at 423.
49

Id.

50 Id.
51 Id. at 422.

52 Id. at 424 (first citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 1977); then citing Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985);
then citing Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984); and then citing Overman
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 350, 353 (C.D. Cal. 1984)).
53 Id. ("'Analytic dissection' and expert testimony are not called for; the gauge of substantial
similarity is the response of the ordinary lay hearer.").
54 Id. at 425.
55 Id.
56 Id.

57 See, e.g., Copeland v. Bieber, 789 F.3d 484, 489 (4th Cir. 2015).
58 See, e.g., McDonaldv. West, 669 F. App'x 59,60 (2d Cir. 2016); Lessemv. Taylor, 766 F. Supp.
2d 504, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Allen v. Destiny's Child, No. 06 C 6606, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63001, at *22-23 (N.D. Ill. July 21, 2009).
59 See Baxter, 812 F.2d 421.
60 See, e.g., Copeland, 789 F.3d at 494 (reversing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal because, after listening
to the songs without any accompanying evidentiary record, the court concluded that the "choruses
are similar enough and also significant enough that a reasonable jury could find the songs
intrinsically similar");Allen, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63001, at *37 (concluding that a music teacher
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fairly conclude that the total concept and feel standard is indeed
contributing to the perceived expansion of copyright scope in today's
music infringement cases. 6 1

But these cases capture only a small part of what's going on when
judges confront music infringement claims. For three reasons, total
concept and feel turns out to be a comparatively insignificant problem
when viewed in context. First, within the jurisdictions that apply the
extrinsic/intrinsic framework, total concept and feel is almost never a
battleground issue except at trial. Because only the extrinsic test is
considered amenable for summary judgment, 62 a defendant filing a
dispositive motion will always focus the argument on a lack of extrinsic
similarity. At that stage, total concept and feel doesn't have much of a
foothold to enter the discussion.
If most cases reached a trial, of course, the test would rear its head
eventually. But they don't. The recent cases involving Katy Perry,

Pharrell Williams, and Led Zeppelin gained widespread media attention
precisely because trials over music infringement are so phenomenally
rare. If one is concerned that it's too easy to incur infringement liability
for derivative music, one should devote more scrutiny to how cases are
handled on summary judgment, where most litigated cases rise or fall. 63
To be sure, even a rare trial might exert some pressure on settlement
values, as subsequent players continue to bargain in the shadow of the
law. 64 Yet I'm skeptical that this particular law casts much shade. By the
time the parties wind up litigating the intrinsic test, the court has almost
is not "competent to speak on behalf of the average listener," and therefore declining to credit the
teacher's opinion that listeners wouldn't notice the plaintiff's alleged similarities and holding that
similarity between the works' total concept and feel "is best left for a jury to decide"); New Old
Music Grp., Inc. v. Gottwald, 122 F. Supp. 3d 78, 95 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (denying summary judgment
over an alleged appropriation of a percussion line because, "in considering the 'total concept and
feel' of these elements in combination," the selection and arrangement of independently
unprotectable drum sounds might have itself been protectable); Griffin v. Sheeran, 351 F Supp. 3d
492, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (denying summary judgment because "[a] jury might side with either
view" as to the works' total concept and feel).
61 See supra text accompanying notes 12-15.
62 See, e.g., Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106, 1119 (9th Cir. 2018) ("A district court applies only
the extrinsic test on a motion for summary judgment, as the intrinsic test is reserved exclusively for
the trier of fact.").
63 See Balganesh, supra note 43, at 793 ("While a vast majority of [copyright] claims either settle
prior to trial or are instead dismissed through motions, . . . [there does exist] the rare occasion
[when] a jury is indeed empaneled to hear a case .... "). Even when a case does reach trial, posttrial motions provide another opportunity for the extrinsic test to sort meritorious claims from
unmeritorious ones, as the recent case against Katy Perry underscores. See Gray v. Perry, No. 2:15CV-05642-CAS-JCx, 2020 U.S. Dist LEXIS 46313, at *39-40 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020). There,
the trial judge set aside the infringement verdict based on a lack of extrinsic similarity while still
concluding that the jury was entitled to find intrinsic similarity in concept and feel. Id. at *54-55.
The extrinsic test, in other words, did all the work. See id.
64 For the classic exploration of this issue, see Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser,
Bargainingin the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979), https://
digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6537&context=ylj
[https://penna.cc/
D5XP-QQE7].
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certainly denied (or the parties have concluded that it wasn't even worth
asking for) summary judgment on the extrinsic test. That sequencing

means that before the intrinsic test can do any work sorting between
winning and losing claims, the court has already signaled that the case
could reasonably go either way. It's a crapshoot. And because the
indeterminacy of the extrinsic test is responsible, it would remain a
crapshoot no matter what we might do to total concept and feel within the
intrinsic test. It's thus fair to expect that the intrinsic test's marginal effect
on ex ante settlement values would be small, especially compared to the
extrinsic one's.

What's more, the fact that only juries decide intrinsic similarity
means that changing its definition would do little to produce clarity for
future actors trying to decide what's permissible. A series of jury verdicts
doesn't generate guidance. A series of judicial decisions resolving
litigants'

motions does.

As Balganesh has argued, "discouraging

summary judgment on the [similarity] question in an effort to have juries
make the determination has prevented copyright jurisprudence from
developing a coherent set of rules and principles that might guide the
decision, thereby producing a body of decisions that appears inextricably
ad hoc and arbitrary." 65 For those who worry that the current system is
producing too much uncertainty, the best way to help is to give courts
more power to act as gatekeepers before trial. Changing the substance of
the intrinsic test without allocating it to a different decisionmaker would
do little on that score.
Second, within the jurisdictions that allow judges greater leeway to
address total concept and feel, it's not obvious that the standard
excessively favors plaintiffs. Defendants have in fact repeatedly disposed
of claims before trial under this standard. 66 If one is primarily concerned
about a lack of analytical rigor, I concede that defense victories in
themselves shouldn't assuage much. But if one is also concerned about
high liability risk and the propertization of feel, as many contemporary
critics are, then these decisions cast some doubt on the total concept and
feel test's role.
Indeed, in some cases, plaintiffs have actively (though
unsuccessfully) lobbied the court not to consider total concept and feel at
all, evidently convinced that a purely dissective approach could at least
65 Balganesh, supra note 43, at 797.
66 See, e.g., Currin v. Arista Records, Inc., 724 F. Supp. 2d 286, 294 (D. Conn. 2010); Damiano v.
Sony Music Entm't, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 623, 631 (D.N.J. 1996); Fulks v. Knowles-Carter, 207 F.
Supp. 3d 274, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); Pyatt v. Raymond, No. 10 Civ. 8764 (CM), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55754 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2011); Batiste v. Najm, 28 F. Supp. 3d 595, 622-23 (E.D. La.
2014); Francescatti v. Germanotta, No. 11 CV 5270, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81794 (N.D. Ill. June
17, 2014); Guity v. Santos, No. 18-cv-10387 (PKC), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210125, at *10-15
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2019).
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muddy the waters enough to reach a jury. In Francescatti v. Germanotta,

for example, the plaintiff argued that the EDM music at issue was too
complex to lend itself to a holistic comparison and therefore demanded
"computer analysis" accompanied by expert explanation. 67 The court

rejected the argument, concluding that "[s]imply listening to the songs,
as the law requires, reveals their utter lack of similarity." 68 In 2019, well
after the Blurred Lines case had ended, the plaintiff in Guity v. Santos

similarly viewed total concept and feel as a weakness rather than a
strength.69 He failed to convince the court that "an ordinary observer with
no musical background may very well be incapable of applying the 'total
concept and feel test' to determine substantial similarity," and the court
dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.70 Even in Baxter, the
case that extended the total concept and feel standard into musical subject
matter to begin with, the plaintiff had tried to foreclose that extension at
the outset for fear that it would hurt his chances. 71 He insisted that a
holistic test geared toward lay audiences wouldn't work "in technical
fields such as music because an infringer can easily deceive the
unsophisticated by immaterial variations in the copyrighted work." 7 2
Because the appeals court thought that a reasonable jury could have found
for the plaintiff even with that test, it never needed to address the issue
and we've been running with the standard ever since. 73
I don't mean to overplay the significance of these arguments, which
don't reflect the full variety of music-infringement claims. Not every
complaint's theory of similarity needs to wrap itself in total concept and
feel in order to succeed. Those plaintiffs trying to zero in on a specific
musical fragment don't stand much to gain from the standard, while those
alleging a more abstract similarity permeating an entire song do.

Nevertheless, even without knowing which category accounts for a
bigger share of music-infringement allegations overall, it at least seems
clear that the fragment-type claims are a major part of the picture. Many

recent cases have been based on short snippets, 74 including the marquee

67 Francescatti,2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81794, at *28-29.
68 Id. at *62.
69 Guity, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210125, at *14-15.
70 Id. at *15-16.
71 See Baxter v. MCA, Inc., 812 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1987).
72 Id. at 424 n.2.
73 See id. The court noted in dicta that it saw "[n]o compelling reason . . . to depart from the
principles enunciated in Krofft, which reiterates that the test of substantial similarity depends upon
the response of the ordinary lay listener." Id. (citing Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v.
McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977)).
74 See, e.g., Rose v. Hewson, No. 17cv1471 (DLC), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14840 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
30, 2018); Bowenv. Paisley, No. 3:13-cv-0414, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114048 (M.D. Tenn. Aug.
25, 2016); TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F. Supp. 2d 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); First Amended
Complaint, Dienel v. Warner-Tamerlane Publ'g Corp., No. 3:16-cv-00978 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 6,
2016).
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ones against both Katy Perry and Led Zeppelin that dominate current

discussions. If we're going to talk about cases in which the total concept
and feel standard hurts defendants, we also need to talk about the cases
in which it may actively help them.
In his treatise eighty years ago, Shafter made an especially strong

version of this argument: If judges apply a feel-oriented standard, it is
defendants who most stand to benefit. 75 Shafter, like the plaintiff in
Baxter decades later, was worried about songwriters using "camouflaging
and decepti[on]" that an average listener test would never detect.76 From
the defendant's perspective, he surmised, allowing the judge to resolve
the case on the papers through "ordinary observation" would offer an
"admirable opportunity" to achieve a "prompt and summary disposal" of
the case. 77 Whether or not history bears out Shafter's entire thesis, he may
at least have been right that screening cases according to judges' intuition
does not obviously disadvantage the accused.
This brings me to the third, and probably most significant, reason
why total concept and feel deserves less attention: That attention should
instead be going to the increased complexity that has built up within the
analytical machinery. Controversial cases like Blurred Lines reach a jury
not because of amorphous claims over feel, but because of highly
technical claims over minutiae. Over the past two decades, the doctrine
surrounding musical works has been experiencing two related shifts: (1)
a more complicated definition of what counts as infringement and (2) a
greater reliance on expert witnesses to explain that definition. Before the
1990s, music infringement cases virtually always turned on similarity in

melody (and, if applicable, any accompanying lyrics). 78 Since then,
however, courts have increasingly come to recognize various
combinations of harmony, rhythm, timbre, tempo, genre, organizational
structure, and percussion elements as representing potentially protectable

material, whether or not a melody is copied along with them. 79 As the
number of elements in play in any given case grows, judges are naturally

going to have a harder time confidently applying the extrinsic test
themselves. I will go out on a limb and venture that not even Judge
Learned Hand could have performed his comparisons had he needed to
manage half a dozen variables instead of just one.

75 SHAFTER,
76 Id. at 213.

supra note 20, at 217-18.

77 Id. at 218-19.
78 See generally Fishman, supra note 16.
79 See id. at 1887-92. In an oft-cited passage, the Ninth Circuit has explained that "[t]here is no one
magical combination of these factors that will automatically substantiate a musical infringement
suit; each allegation of infringement will be unique." Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 849 (9th Cir.
2004).
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Not surprisingly, then, experts have become virtually indispensable
in music cases, particularly within the Ninth Circuit. In its original
explication of the extrinsic test in 1977, the Ninth Circuit described expert
testimony as potentially "appropriate." 80 In its 2000 decision in Three
Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, however, the court elevated the importance

of expert evidence in music cases, declaring that "[t]he extrinsic test often
requires . . expert testimony." 8 1Four years later, in Swirsky v. Carey, the
court restated that proposition, but this time without the word "often"
experts were simply required, full stop. 82 Years later, that categorical
requirement would end up playing a large role in the appeal of the Blurred

Lines verdict. 83 Responding to an extremely detailed musicological
analysis in the dissenting opinion, the appellate majority doubled down
on the necessity of expert testimony:
It is unrealistic to expect district courts to possess even a baseline
fluency in musicology, much less to conduct an independent
musicological analysis at a level as exacting as the one used by the
dissent. After all, we require parties to present expert testimony in

musical infringement cases for a reason. 84

That last line is the key. Adjudicating claims of nonliteral musical
similarity has become so intricate and multidimensional that, at least in
the Ninth Circuit, the system can't even operate without experts on hand.
Contrary to the way it's sometimes portrayed, 85 the BlurredLines case
didn't really involve any interesting legal questions about the
protectability of a song's overall sound and feel. 86 It was fundamentally
a case about the nitty gritty details that you would find when you peer
underneath a work's hood. 87 A forty-one-page expert declaration that
supported the infringement claim's leap over the summary judgment

hurdle was built on "eight intersecting similarities," 88 some of which
comprised sub-elements that in turn were to be weighed differently
according to a particular hierarchy, 89 which itself incorporated multiple

&

80 See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th
Cir. 1977) ("Since [the determination of whether there is substantial similarity in ideas] is an
extrinsic test, analytic dissection and expert testimony are appropriate.").
81 Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 485 (9th Cir. 2000).
82 Swirsky, 376 F.3d at 845.
83 See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
84 Id. at 1137.
85 Cf sources cited supra notes 14-15.
86 See Williams, 895 F.3d 1106.
87 See id.
88 Declaration of Judith Finell in Support of Counter-Claimants' Joint Opposition to Plaintiffs
Counter-Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Or, in the Alternative, Partial Summary
Judgment ¶ 13, at 3, Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No. CV13-06004-JAK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 20, 2014).
89 Id. ¶ 23, at 5.
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branches along a decision tree. 90 At trial, that expert devoted multiple
demonstrative slides to each of those similarities, complete with
transcriptions, visual diagrams, and timelines accurate to the millisecond
showing how the corresponding audio clips matched up. 91 The trial
exhibit color-coded this eight-part "composite of similarities" in a
chronological bar chart. 92 In one particular sequence, less than one second
of music from the work-in-suit merited five slides of comparative audio
clips; pitch-shifted MIDI synthesizer renderings; and a time-stamped
map of that one-second theme's "variants" recurring throughout the
accused work. 93 The infringement allegation was, if nothing else, laden
with detail. 94
"Blurred Lines" - Constellation of Similarities Location Chart

.x.,

'

xnFigure

1. Slide From Gaye Estate's Demonstrative
Exhibit in Blurred
Lines Trial95

I've argued elsewhere that we're asking both courts and second
comers to keep track of too many such details, and I've recommended a
return to a melody-centered infringement test that would be more
administrable and predictable. 96 Whether you agree with that prescription
or not, however, let's not misdiagnose the problem. The outcome of the

90 Id. ¶ 24, at 5-6.
91 See 5 Supplemental Excerpts of Record at 861-903, Williams v. Gaye, 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.
2018) (No. 15-56880) [hereinafter Trial Exhibit 376].
92 See infra Figure 1.
93 Trial Exhibit 376, supra note 91, at 871-75.
94 See Williams v. Gaye, 895 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2018).
95 Trial Exhibit 376, supra note 91, at 890.
96 See Fishman, supra note 16.
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Blurred Lines litigation wasn't a product of "feel" but of the technical
and multivariable questions we now require experts to answer.

For a doctrine that's been so pilloried as a general matter, total
concept and feel might very well be music law's most surprisingly
innocuous feature. It worked reasonably well in its early, pre-Roth
incarnation, and it's done little to contribute to the sensational trials of
today. Like many others, I'd like to see fewer of those trials, and more
development of precedential ground rules concerning which kinds of
musical copying are permissible. But the total concept and feel standard
isn't doing much to stand in the way.

